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Canadian Net Income Stabilization Acconnts and Other Options for Achieving
Counter-Cyclical Program Payments with Planting Flexibility
Abstract
This discussion outHne describes the Canadian Net Income StabiHzation Account
(NISA) concept; provides comparisons to U.S. proposals for Farm and Ranch ^sk
Management (FARRM) and Individual Risk Management Accounts (IRMA); and
compares these concepts to other selected policy options with respect to the counter
cyclical nature ofpayments and planting flexibility criteria.
Staff Paper 333 embodies the discussion outlineused by the author in presentation
to the National Commission for 21st Century ProductionAgriculture. The 1996FAIR Act
established the Commission to develop recommendations on future U.S. FarmPolicy for
theCongress and the President prior to expiration of the current farm policy.
Canadian Net Income Stabilization Accounts and Otiier Options for Achieving
Counter-Cyclical Program Payments with Planting Flexibility
Discussion Objectives:
• Describe the nature and context of the Canadian Net Income Stabilization Account
(NISA) concept.
• Compare the NISA concept to U.S. proposals for Farm and Ranch Risk
Management (FARRM) and Individual Risk Management Accounts (IRMA).
• Compare the savings account concepts to other selected policy options with
respect to the counter-cyclical nature ofpayments and planting flexibility criteria.
I, The NISA Concept:
• Federal Govt. matches farmer NISA deposits up to 3% Eligible Net Sales (ENS).
(Gross Sales of qualifying commodities less Qualifying Purchases such as seed,
plants, livestock purchases.)
• Maximum ENS eligible for match is limited to $250,000 per year per entity. So,
maximum Govt. match is $7,500 per year.
• Some Provinces offer enhanced matching contributions above 3 % level.
• Farmers can deposit additional non-matchable deposits above 3% up to 20% ENS
per year with no Govt. match.
• Govt. pays 3 percent interest rate bonus on farmer deposits over bank rate.
II. The NISA Process:
• Farmers make application and deposit to their NISA Fund I account at their own
banking institution.
• Annual deadline: Individual - June 15th; Entities- June 30th; Application Fee $55.
• Entitlementis reduced 5%per month for late applications up to December31st.
Govt. matching funds and interest payments are deposited in a NISA Fund II
account held by Govt.
Farmer uses after tax dollars for farmer deposits.
Interest earnings and Govt. matching funds become taxable upon withdrawal.
Unused matchable deposit allocations can be carried forward 5 years.
Max NISA balance: 1.5 times 5-year average ENS.
No additional fimds can be deposited until balance falls below ceiling.
III. NISA Withdrawal Triggers:
1. Stabilization Trigger:
• A farmer's currentyearGross Margin falls belowthe average for farm forup to 5
previous years. Participation for oneyear is required to use this trigger.
• Gross Marginequals Net Sales from all ag commodities, plus income from
contract work andmachine rental, minus eligible expenses.
2. Minimum Income Trigger:
• Farmer's current year net income from all sources falls below a threshold level
plus matchable deposit. (Raised 6/21/99 from $10,000 perindividual or$20,000
per family to $20,000 per individual or$35,000 perfamily.)
IV. Deeming a Deposit
Farmer may use triggered withdrawal to make all or part ofmatchable deposit.
This allows a farmer tomake amatchable deposit to receive theGovt. match ina
year with low cash flow.
Ifthe triggered withdrawal is less than the matchable deposit, the farmer can only
deem up to the amount ofthe trigger. Ifthe farmer wishes to deposit the rest of
maximum matchable deposit, itmust beaccomplished from the farmer's own
resources.
V. Interim Withdrawals (Advanced Payments)
• Introduced June 1998 (Annual Application Deadline is December 31st.)
• Allows farmer to receive withdrawal funds from his/er NISA account in the year in
which financial need arises.
• The farmer's Maximum Actual Withdrawal Trigger is reduced by the Interim
Withdrawal amount.
• If the Interim Withdrawal exceeds the Maximum Actual Withdrawal Trigger
entitlement by more than 10 %, an overpayment charge of3% ofthe excess
withdrawal amount is charged to the farmer.
• A farmer has one year to repay the overpayment amount and overpayment charge
into the Fund I Accoimt.
• Failure to repay by deadline results in mandatory opt out ofthe NISA program.
• Partial payment does not result in extension ofdeadline.
VI. Closing a NISA Account
1. Voluntary Opt Out
• Notify NISA in writing anytime and request lump sum or annual installments for
up to 5 years.
• If youvoluntarily leaveyou canrejoin NISA in oneyearby repaying previous
NISAbalance or rejoinNISA in two yearswithoutrepayingpreviousbalance.
2. Mandatory Opt Out
• Failure to complete application for two years causes mandatory optout.
• Failure to complete application after receiving Interimwithdrawal
• Failure to repay overpayment of interim withdrawal within 1yeardeadline.
• Balance paid in limip sum. Must miss 2 consecutive years before rejoining NISA.
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Vn. Canadian Farm Economic Facts
• 276,550 Canadian farms according to 1996 Canada Ag Census.
• 1998 Canadian realized net farm income $2.5 billion (After depreciation)
• Canadian NISA balances: January 1999 $2.8 billion
Table 1. Canadian NISA Participants and Balances Oct. 1998
Sales Class Participants Average Account Balance
$0 to $49,999 60,799 $5,727
$50,000 to $99,999 31,665 $12,879
$100,000 to $249,999 33,799 $23,766
$250,000 to $499,999 9,844 $40,744
$500,000 or more 4,910 $83,934
Total* 143,738 $16,614
unallocated accounts.
Source; Agriculture and Agro-Food Canada, March 1999
Vm. Tlie Big Picture of Canadian Farm Policy
Phased outof Government Gross Income Revenue Insurance (GRIP) by 1998~too
costly.
PrivateCrop InsuranceSubsidized by Government.
Net Income Stabilization Accounts
Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA)
No AMTA or Deficiency Payments
No Marketing Loans or LDP Payments
Table 2, Canadian Federal Government Gross Direct Payments - $ millions
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998f 1999f
NISA .41 46 115 153 224 427
GRIP 542 185 32 23 0 0
Crop Insurance 435 328 276 313 309 450
Source: Agriculture and Agro-Food Canada, March 1999.
IX. Canada's Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA) Program
Special 2 year program for 1998 and 1999.
AIDA funded 60% by national - 40% by Provinces.
.--Eligibility: Income TaxFilers whose Gross Margin falls below 70% ofup to 5 year
average.
Special calculation for beginning farmers.
Extended/: Minister VanCliefAnnouncement 1/13/00 to inject$1 billionmore into
AIDA over next 2 years.
Total federal farm income safetynet spending is forecast to be $2.2 billion over
next two years-$3.6 billion including provincial funds.
Table 3. Comparison ojfNISA, FARRM, and IRMA Accounts.
Policy Attributes NISA FARRM IRMA
Farmer Deposit
Maximums/Minimums
Max 20% ENS
Eligible Nk
Sales/yr
Max 20% Net
Farm Income/yr
Minimum 2% Gross
Income/yr
1040 Schedule F
Maximum Account
Balance
150% up to 5 year
average Eligible
Net Sales
None 150% of 3 year
average Gross
Income
Farmer Deposits
Pretax/After Tax?
After Tax Income Pretax Income Pretax Income
Government Matching
Deposit Contribution
Match $ for $ up to
3% ENS ($7,500/yr
Maximum)
None Crop Insurance
Subsidy Equivalent
Plus CAT Coverage
Interest Rate Bonus paid
by Government
Additional 3 % on
farmer deposits
None None
Government Match
Taxable?
After withdrawal Not Applicable After withdrawal
Interest Earnings
Taxable?
After withdrawal Annually After withdrawal
Farmer Deposit
Withdrawal Taxable?
None/Taxes paid
before deposit
After
Withdrawal
After Withdrawal
Withdrawal Triggers and
time limits?
Gross Margin less
than 100% of up to
5 year average; or
Net Income below
$20,000 for
individual or
$35,000 for family
Farmer Option;
Rolling 5 year
time limit on
each year's
deposits.
Current year Gross
Income less than
80% of3 year
average
Additional
Attributes
NISA FARRM IRMA
Advanced
Withdrawals
Yes Not Applicable;
Farmer Option
None Described
Use of estimated
withdrawal for
Farmer Deposit
Yes Not Applicable;
Farmer Option
None Described
Limits on Insurance
Coverage
None None Farmer allowed to
purchase only non
subsidized
insurance
Unused Match
Carried Forward
Allocation
carried forward
up to 5 years
Not Applicable None Described
Voluntary Close Out
Options
Yes, Lump sum
or 5 year
installments
Yes, if less than 5
years
None Described
Mandatory Close
Out Criteria
Failure to apply
for 3 years;
Failure to apply
after advance
payment; Fail to
meet repayment
deadline for
overpayment
10% penalty if
each year's
deposits are not
withdrawn in 5
years.
Leave farming for
non-farm
employment;
retirement; or
bankruptcy
Differential tax rate
bias for high income
farmers
No, Farmer
deposits from
after tax income
Yes, Greater
incentive to save
for higher tax rates
Yes, Greater
incentive to save
for higher tax rates
X. Summary Comparisons of Incentives for Saving.
1. Income stabilization potential ofFARRM concept is oflimited benefit ifweather
cycles are normally 20 years and livestock cycles are longer than five.
2. U.S. farmers already have cash accounting and income averaging provisions in the
tax code, therefore FARRM accounts may be ofmarginal benefit.
3. If a significantly stronger farm safety net is to be achieved via savings concepts,
policy makers must consider more substantial options like NISA or IRMA.
4. Should those who self-insure by saving for bad times receive level playing field
subsidies compared to those who receive subsidized crop insurance?
5. Should higher income farmers receive greater tax incentives to save for bad times?
XI. Summary Impacts of Incentives for Saving for Bad Times
1. Not a production cost like insurance premiums. Adds asset and loan collateral to
Balance Sheet. Diversifies farmer investment portfolio.
2. All commodities includinglivestock, forestry, and specialty crops can benefit.
3. Govt. expenditures are more stable and predictable. Reduces/but does not
eliminate Disaster Program need.
4. Counter-cyclical payment eliminates highpayments in goodyears. Farm
withdrawals only made in poor years.
5. Income stabilization capability grows over time.
6. Consistent with decoupling farm programs fi-om planting decisions tomaintain
flexibility.
7. Consistent withmarket-oriented farm policy andimproving Farm Safety net..
8. Perhaps more consistent with WTO rules.
9. . Deposits Increase Rural Bank Loan Capacity and Economic Development
Capacity ofRural Community.
Xn. How does NISA/IRMA Compare to Other Selected Policy Alternatives with
respect to Counter-Cyclical Payments and Planting Flexibility?
Option 1: Use AMTA payments to Increase Loan Rate for Loan Deficiency
Payments and Marketing Loan Gains.
• Makes payments more counter-cyclical within current farm program framework.
• Reduces planting flexibility to degree that pa3Tnentsbecome more linked to
specific program commodities in current year enterprise mix.
• Increases domestic incentive to produce more while forcing adjustment on to rest
ofworld.
• Continues to compensate farmers for good weather and penalize farmers for bad
weather.
Option 2. Reinstate Farmer-Owned Grain Reserves.
• Reduces planting flexibility to degree that access to the reserve is beneficial and
linked to specific program commodities in farmer's enterprise mix for the current
year.
• Coimter-cyclical? Depends on conditions in 3 years and/orwhether authority for
extensionis provided ifpoor economic conditions in 3 years.
• Increasesmarket price ofcurrentyear andprovides incentive to producemore
abroad as U.S. grain is withdrawn from market.
• Reduces market prices within 3 years as grain reserves re-enter market.
• Compensates farmers for good weather and penalizes farmers for bad weather.
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Option 3. Expand Conservation Reserve Program and/or Conservation/
Environmental Amenity Payments during economic downturns.
• Total Planting Flexibility: payments decoupled from current year enterprise mix.
• Payments become more counter-cyclical to the degree that CRP expansion is
triggered by economic downturn criteria.
• Policy issue regarding supply control implications.
• Differential impacts for livestock and forestry crops.
Option 4: Revenue Loss Payments when the national (state or county average) gross
revenue per acre for the current year falls below a set percentage of the 5-year
national (state or county average) gross revenue for the crop.
• Enhances counter-cyclical nature of farm program payments.
• Reduces Planting Flexibility ifpayments are made only for specific program
commodities because payments become linked to the farmer's enterprise mix
decisions for the current year. Planting Flexibility is retained only ifRevenue Loss
Pa3Tnents are based on proxy enterprise mix, such as county, state or national
average crop mix which decouples payments from planting decisions.
• Solves problem ofrewarding for good weather and penalizing for poor weather.
• Payments to individual farmers are less reflective ofactual losses as proxy loss and
enterprise mix parameters become more removed from individual farm conditions.
Option 5. Government Purchased Insurance
• Enhances counter-cyclical nature ofpayments.
• Planting Flexibility may be reduced to degree that access and availability of
insurance products are related to specific commodities in current enterprise mix.
• As premium subsidies increase, production is encouraged in more marginal areas.
• (CARD suggests using county average yields to reduce adverse selection, but that
also reduces incentives for risk management among good producers as well. )
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Option 6. NISA/IRMA Accounts.
• Counter-cyclical payments by design ofwithdrawal triggers.
• Provides total flexibility in planting decisions because benefits decoupled from
current year enterprise mix.
• Payments are based on whole farm gross(net) farm revenues (size) up to policy
imposed limits.
• Provides safety net for livestock, forestry and specialty crops that presentlydon't
have access to products in the insurance market.
• As structural change occurs, contract agriculture will likely increase and
identification of comparable marketpriceswill becomemore difficult. Safetynet
policies using gross or net income calculations (schedule F) become more viable
compared to policies that rely on identification ofreliable price and production
information for specific commodities.
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